

Telecommunication Network Reliability under seismic event considering the dependence on the power supply

Latin American Congress on Industrial and Applied Mathematics

D. Jiménez, L. Gacitua, H. Cancela, D. Olivares and J. Barrera

January 29, 2023



UN warns that world risks becoming 'uninhabitable hell' for millions unless leaders take climate action

 ${\it https://edition.com/2020/10/13/world/un-natural-disasters-climate-intl-hnk/index.html}$

UN warns that world risks becoming 'uninhabitable hell' for millions unless leaders take climate action



2023



Policies and practices for disaster risk management should be based on an understanding of disaster risk in all its dimensions of vulnerability, exposure of persons and assets, hazard characteristics and environment. Such knowledge can be leveraged for the purpose of pre-disaster risk assessment, for prevention and mitigation and for the development and implementation of appropriate preparedness and effective response to disasters.

Priority 1, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030

Where do earthquakes occur?

a)







Figure: a) Ring of Fire (Source: ArcNews Vol 36, No 2, by ESRI, page 7), b) Historical Location of earthquakes in Chile (Source: [1], c) Earthquakes and their equivalence in released energy (Source: [1])



- ▶ We need to consider ground motion
- We cannot get there from direct observation
- The Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) approach attempts to solve this

How to assess the damage generated in an earthquake?





The PSHA (Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis)





Telecommunications network





REUNA





Nodes



Links

Peak ground displacement (PGD)





$$\ln(PGD) = 5.52 - \frac{4.43k_c}{PGA} - 20.39 \left(\frac{k_c}{PGA}\right)^2 + 42.61 \left(\frac{k_c}{PGA}\right)^3 - 28.74 \left(\frac{k_c}{PGA}\right)^4 + 2\ln(PCA)$$

0.72 ln(*PGA*)

The repair rate is $RR_I = \alpha$ (4.317*PGD* - 0.324)



Details [2]. Damage of cables after the earthquake in New Zealand [3]

Reliability metrics



Let the set of components C by $C = N \cup L$ (N= nodes and L= links) The network state is stored in a structure function ϕ .

$$\phi: \{0,1\}^{|C|} \to \{0,1\}$$
 (1

We obtain an incidence matrix $M_{|N| \times |L|}^{\overline{t}}$ associated to the telecommunication network. We use the reliability metrics associated with network connectivity for telecommunications networks (the *st* reliability and the *st*-DC reliability,[4]).

$$\mathsf{r}_{\mathsf{st}}(ar{t}) = \mathsf{P}(\phi(\mathsf{X}_{ar{t}}) = 1) = \mathbb{E}(\phi)$$

(2)

Network used in the study: REUNA





Design	Addicional links
R-3A	(Valparaíso-ESO), (Arica-Pto.Montt), (AURA-ALMA)
R-3B	(Valparaíso-ALMA), (Arica-Pto.Montt), (AURA-ESO)
R-3C	(Valparaíso-ALMA), (Arica-AURA), (Puerto Montt-ESO)
R-3D	(Valparaíso-Arica), (ALMA-AURA), (Pto.Montt-ESO)
R-3E	(Valparaíso-ESO), (Arica-AURA), (Pto.Montt-ALMA)
R-3F	(Valparaíso-Arica), (ESO-AURA), (Pto.Montt-ALMA)

Design

versions proposed in [5]



- We incorporate the impact that the electricity grid has on the telecommunications network.
- ▶ There is a geographical correlation in the earthquake failures in these networks.
- ► The study of dependence is new
- ▶ We evaluate how networks evolve over time.

Electricity grid





SEN

Edges

We evaluate how networks evolve over time.





Let's see what happens with REUNA





Characteristics of REUNA and SEN



REUNA

- 18 nodes
- 29 arcs:
 - 19 arcs REUNA
 - 22 arcs (REUNA +3 links)
 - 23 arcs (REUNA +4 links)
- 8 versions of REUNA
- Different damage levels



SEN

- Nodes:
 - 327 Substations
 - 218 Power plants
- 405 transmission lines (connecting substations)
- A single grid design
- Considers restoration over time
- We evaluated 3 impact scenarios

REUNA without dependence



st reliability								
Design	Min.	Avg.	Max.					
Original	0.416	0.703	0.949					
R-3A	0.538	0.765	0.950					
R-3B	0.661	0.844	0.950					
R-3C	0.654	0.839	0.950					
R-3D	0.500	0.753	0.950					
R-3E	0.704	0.850	0.950					
R-3F	0.705	0.849	0.950					
R-3A+1	0.538	0.765	0.950					
R-3C+1	0.659	0.841	0.950					
R-3F+1	0.714	0.853	0.950					

st - DC reliability									
Design	Min.	Avg.	Max.						
Original	0	0.539	0.949						
R-3A	0	0.629	0.949						
R-3B	0	0.664	0.949						
R-3C	0	0.669	0.949						
R-3D	0	0.640	0.949						
R-3E	0	0.654	0.949						
R-3F	0	0.659	0.949						
R-3A+1	0	0.674	0.949						
R-3C+1	0	0.728	0.949						
R-3F+1	0	0.708	0.949						

st reliability for the different network designs $(k_c = 0.4)$ Average st - DC reliability for the different network designs $(k_c = 0.4)$

REUNA without dependence



st reliability								
Design	Min.	Avg.	Max.					
Original	0.416	0.703	0.949					
R-3A	0.538	0.765	0.950					
R-3B	0.661	0.844	0.950					
R-3C	0.654	0.839	0.950					
R-3D	0.500	0.753	0.950					
R-3E	0.704	0.850	0.950					
R-3F	0.705	0.849	0.950					
R-3A+1	0.538	0.765	0.950					
R-3C+1	0.659	0.841	0.950					
R-3F+1	0.714	0.853	0.950					

st -	-DCr	eliability	
Design	Min.	Avg.	Max.
Original	0	0.539	0.949
R-3A	0	0.629	0.949
R-3B	0	0.664	0.949
R-3C	0	0.669	0.949
R-3D	0	0.640	0.949
R-3E	0	0.654	0.949
R-3F	0	0.659	0.949
R-3A+1	0	0.674	0.949
R-3C+1	0	0.728	0.949
R-3F+1	0	0.708	0.949

st reliability for the different network designs ($k_c = 0.4$) Average st - DC reliability for the different network designs ($k_c = 0.4$)

SEN Performance



The availability of REUNA nodes immediately after the earthquake.



st reliability for different network designs with SEN (high (H))

Evaluation of st reliability in $\overline{t} = 0$



Mathematical Method in Network Reliability



- When the dependence on SEN is considered, the st reliability of REUNA decreases by 10-20%.
- Adding additional links in the original topology is not always significant when considering dependency.
- Consideration of how SEN affects the REUNA extension versions influences the future design decision for all extensions analyzed.
- The proposed extensions will only make sense if backup equipment (batteries, solar cells,...) is considered.











FGV EMAp ESCOLA DE MATEMATICA ADJUCADA

Organización:

References



- Usgs.Gov, "Latest earthquakes." (Accessed 10 May 2022).
- S. Esposito, A. Botta, M. De Falco, A. Pacifico, E. Chioccarelli, A. Pescapè, A. Santo, and I. Iervolino, "Preliminary seismic risk analysis of a data network," in *Proceedings of the 29th European Safety and Reliability Conference (ESREL)*, pp. 3031–3038, Research Publishing Services, 2020.
- S. Giovinazzi, A. Austin, R. Ruiter, C. Foster, M. Nayyerloo, N.-K. Nair, and L. Wotherspoon, "Resilience and fragility of the telecommunication network to seismic events," *Bulletin of the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering*, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 318–328, 2017.
- H. Cancela, G. Guerberoff, F. Robledo, and P. Romero, "Reliability maximization in stochastic binary systems," in *2018 21st Conference on Innovation in Clouds, Internet and Networks and Workshops (ICIN)*, pp. 1–7, IEEE, 2018.
- I. Bachmann and J. Bustos-Jiménez, "Improving the chilean internet robustness: Increase the interdependencies or change the shape of the country?," in

Anexos





Ground-motion prediction equation (GMPE) [6]



$$\begin{split} \mathsf{ln}(\mathsf{SA}(\mathsf{T})) &= \theta_1 + f_{\mathsf{source}} + f_{\mathsf{path}} + f_{\mathsf{event/depth}} + f_{\mathsf{site}} + f_{\mathsf{FABA}} \\ f_{\mathsf{source}} &= \theta_4 \Delta C_1 + f_{\mathsf{mag}}(M_w) \\ f_{\mathsf{mag}} &= \begin{cases} \theta_4 \left(M_w - C_d \right), & \text{if } M_w \leq C_d \\ \theta_5 \left(M_w - C_d \right), & \text{if } M_w > C_d \\ C_d &= C_1 + \Delta C_1 \end{cases} \\ f_{\mathsf{path}} &= \left[\theta_2 + \theta_{14} + \theta_3 \left(M_w - 7.8 \right) \right] \\ &\times \ln \left(R + C_4 \exp \left(\theta_9 \left(M_w - 6 \right) \right) \right) + \theta_6 R \\ f_{\mathsf{event/depth}} &= \left[\theta_{10} + \theta_{11} \left(\min \left(Z_h, 120 \right) - 60 \right) \right] \end{split}$$

Ground-motion prediction equation (GMPE)



$$\begin{split} f_{\text{site}} \left(PGA_{M}, V_{\text{S30}} \right) \\ &= \begin{cases} \theta_{12} \ln \left(\frac{V_{\text{S}}^{*}}{V_{\text{lin}}} \right) \\ -b \ln \left(PGA_{M} + c \right) \\ +b \ln \left(PGA_{M} + c \left(\frac{V_{\text{S}}^{*}}{V_{\text{lin}}} \right)^{n} \right), & \text{if } V_{\text{S30}} < V_{\text{lin}} \\ \theta_{12} \ln \left(\frac{V_{\text{S}}^{*}}{V_{\text{lin}}} \right) + b \ln \left(\frac{V_{\text{S}}}{V_{\text{lin}}} \right), & \text{if } V_{\text{S30}} > V_{\text{lin}} \\ \end{cases} \\ V_{\text{S}}^{*} = \begin{cases} 1000, & \text{if } V_{\text{S30}} > 1000 \\ V_{\text{S30}}, & \text{if } V_{\text{S30}} \le 1000 \end{cases} \end{split}$$

$$f_{ extsf{FABA}}(R) = \left(heta_7 + heta_8 \ln\left(rac{ extsf{max}(R,85)}{40}
ight)
ight).$$

Results







Assumptions for calculating PGD

Critical Accelerations (a_c) for Susceptibility Categories

Susceptibility Category	None	Ι	Π	III	IV	v	VI	VII	VIII	IX	Х
Critical Accelerations (g)	None	0.60	0.50	0.40	0.35	0.30	0.25	0.20	0.15	0.10	0.05

Landslide Susceptibility of Geologic Groups

Geologic Group		Slope Angle, degrees					
÷			10-15	15-20	20-30	30-40	>40
(a) DRY (groundwater below level of sliding)							
A	Strongly Cemented Rocks (crystalline rocks and well-cemented sandstone, $c' = 300 \text{ psf}, \phi' = 35^\circ$)	None	None	I	п	IV	VI
в	Weakly Cemented Rocks and Soils (sandy soils and poorly cemented sandstone, $c' = 0, \phi' = 35^{\circ}$)	None	ш	IV	v	VI	VII
с	Argillaceous Rocks (shales, clayey soil, existing landslides, poorly compacted fills, $c = 0 \phi = 20^{\circ}$)	v	VI	VII	IX	IX	IX
	(b) WET (groundwater	level at	ground s	urface)			
A	Strongly Cemented Rocks (crystalline rocks and well-cemented sandstone, c' =300 psf, ϕ' = 35°)	None	ш	VI	VII	VIII	VIII
в	Weakly Cemented Rocks and Soils (sandy soils and poorly cemented sandstone, $c'=0$, $\phi'=35^{\circ}$)	v	VIII	IX	IX	IX	х
с	Argillaceous Rocks (shales, clayey soil, existing landslides, poorly compacted fills, $c' = 0 \phi' = 20^{\circ}$)	VII	IX	х	х	х	х



The reliability $r_{st}(j, \bar{t})$ is the probability of correct operation for each time instant \bar{t} , is calculated for each energy supply scenario j:

$$r_{st}(j,ar{t})= extsf{P}(\phi(X^j_{ar{t}})=1)=\mathbb{E}(\phi)$$

(3)